Lakota v Kazahstanu 1931–1933

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Lakota v Kazahstanu 1931–1933, znana tudi kot Asharshylyk in Zulmat ter Kazahstanska katastrofa,[1] je bila lakota, v kateri je umrlo 1,5 milijona ljudi v sovjetskem Kazahstanu, ki je bil takrat del Ruske socialistične federativne sovjetske republike v Sovjetski zvezi, od katerih je bilo 1,3 milijona etničnih Kazahstancev. Ocenjujejo, da je zaradi lakote umrlo od 38 do 42 odstotkov vseh Kazahstancev,[2] kar je najvišji odstotek katere koli etnične skupine, ki jo je ubila sovjetska lakota v letih 1932–1933. Drugi viri navajajo, da je umrlo kar 2,0 do 2,3 milijona.[3]

Lakota v Kazahstanu 1931–1933
ALAGolod.jpg
Spominska kocka na mestu, postavljena za bodoči spomenik žrtvam lakote (1931–1933) v središču Almatyja v Kazahstanu. Spomenik je bil zgrajen leta 2017.
LokacijaKazahstan, Sovjetska zveza
Datum1931–1933
Žrtve2,0 do 2,3 milijona

Lakota se je začela pozimi 1930, eno leto pred drugo lakoto v Ukrajini, imenovano holodomor, z vrhuncem v letih 1931–1933.[4][5][6] Zaradi lakote so Kazahstanci postali manjšina v Kazahstanski ASSR, kar je povzročilo ogromno ljudi, ki so umrli ali so sami se izselili in šele v devetdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja, po razpadu Sovjetske zveze, so Kazahstanci ponovno postali največja etnična skupina v Kazahstanu. Pred lakoto je bilo okoli 60 % prebivalcev republike etničnih Kazahstancev, delež pa se je po lakoti močno zmanjšal na okoli 38 % prebivalstva.[7] Nekateri znanstveniki menijo, da lakota spada v širšo zgodovino kolektivizacije v Sovjetski zvezi in del sovjetske lakote v letih 1932–1933.

Nekateri zgodovinarji in znanstveniki lakoto opisujejo kot genocid nad Kazahstanci, ki ga je zagrešila sovjetska država, vendar ni dokazov, ki bi podprli to stališče.[8] V Kazahstanu so nekatere študije ponovile sovjetsko razlago genocida in ga označile kot genocid Goloshchyokin (kazaščinsko: Голощёкин геноциді / Goloşekindık genotsid, kazahstanska izgovorjava: [ɡɐləˌʂʲokʲinˡtʂʲokʲinˈdʂʲokʲinˈdʂʲokʲinˈdʂʲokʲinˈdʂʲokʲinˈdəpchysɪma-je-tətəschyɐɪ]. Goloshchyokin je bil prvi sekretar komunistične partije v Kazahstanski ASSR in je znan tudi kot eden glavnih storilcev usmrtitve družine Romanov.

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Sklici[uredi | uredi kodo]

  1. Conquest, Robert (1987). The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-famine.
  2. Getty, J. Arch; Manning, Roberta Thompson, ur. (1993). Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives. Cambridge University Press. str. 265. ISBN 9780521446709.
  3. Pannier, Bruce (28 December 2007). "Kazakhstan: The Forgotten Famine". RFERL. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Pridobljeno dne 26 November 2021.
  4. Pannier, Bruce (28 December 2007). "Kazakhstan: The Forgotten Famine". Rferl.org. Pridobljeno dne 9 July 2015.
  5. Isabelle, Ohayon (13 January 2016). "The Kazakh Famine: The Beginnings of Sedentarization".
  6. Cameron, Sarah (10 September 2016). "The Kazakh Famine of 1930–33: Current Research and New Directions". East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (angleščina). 3 (2): 117–132. doi:10.21226/T2T59X. ISSN 2292-7956. Pridobljeno dne 19 November 2021 – via ResearchGate.
  7. Қазақстан тарихы: Аса маңызды кезеңдері мен ғылыми мәселелері. Жалпы білім беретін мектептің қоғамдык- гуманитарлық бағытындағы 11-сыныбына арналған оқулық / М.Қойгелдиев, Ә.Төлеубаев, Ж.Қасымбаев, т.б. — Алматы: «Мектеп» баспасы, 2007. — 304 бет,суретті. ISBN 9965-36-106-1
  8. Ohayon, Isabelle (28 September 2013). "The Kazakh Famine: The Beginnings of Sedentarization". Sciences Po. Paris Institute of Political Studies. Pridobljeno dne 19 December 2021. In the early 1990s, some Kazakh historians (Abylkhozhin, Tatimov) characterized the famine as 'Goloshchekin's genocide,' attributing sole responsibility for this tragedy to the first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and accentuating his contempt towards the people, whom perceived as backwards. Although unmentioned in the magnum opus of the history of Kazakhstan (Istorija Kazakhstana s drevnejshyhvremen do nashihdnej, 2010: 284 et sqq.), the genocide argument currently found in certain textbooks were to some extent an empty exercise because it was not based on the international legal definition of genocide and did not go particularly far in terms of evidence. Instead, these arguments were consistent with the official Soviet contention that considered that the forced resignation of Goloshchekin and his replacement by Mirzojan reveal that the entire episode was the work of a single man. Although it has been demonstrated and acknowledged that as political leader, Goloshchekin played a key role in covering up the full extent of increases in mortality between 1930 and 1933, it remains there is scant evidence of a desire on the part of the government or particular individuals to exterminate the Kazakhs as a group, or even to identify compelling motives for such a deliberate strategy. Indeed, the Kazakh population never represented a political danger for the Soviet government, nor did the protest movement or secessionist leanings among the population at any time imperil Soviet territorial integrity (Ohayon, 2006: 365).